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SOCIAL WELFARE - PAUPERS REQUIREMENTS

RESIDENCY

Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967),
cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1968).
One of the fundamental concepts of the English Poor Laws the progenitors of modern welfare systems' - is the idea of settlement.2 The theory is that each person belongs to some geographical area, and the citizens of that place are the proper people to
provide for their poor. In order to determine when it is that a person truly belongs to an area, it has been a traditional requirement
that some period of residency be established before settlement is
granted.3 Although the scope of welfare in this country has broadened considerably since the Poor Laws, and much is governed by
statute, residence requirements are still common.4
Recently, however, there has been some judicial controversy
over several State statutes which have reflected these traditional
settlement concepts, as federal district courts in Delaware and Connecticut have considered the constitutionality of residence requirements for categorical welfare assistance,' and have rendered seemingly inconsistent decisions.'
The considerations involved in this area are whether such residency statutes conform to the privileges and immunities and equal
protection clauses of the 14th amendment'7 The privileges and
immunities argument is based upon the privilege of a national citizen to travel freely into the various States either for temporary
residence or permanent domicile. Any statute which interferes with
this privilege, it is argued, is unconstitutional. The equal protec1 See Harvath, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical
Assistance Programs,54 CALIF. L. REv. 567 (1966).
2 See 70 C.J.S. Paupers § 20 (1951).
3 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1539 (4th ed. 1951).
4 See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.05 (Page 1954).
5 Categorical assistance is to be distinguished from general assistance. The former
includes specific programs such as aid to dependent children, old age benefits, and deaf
and blind benefits. There is federal participation in categorical assistance. General
assistance is State controlled and State financed. See Harvath, supra note 1. The
present discussion concerns itself with categorical assistance only, although the arguments
herein advanced may be relevant to the latter also.
6 Compare Green v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967),
with Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), cert. granted, 36
U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1968).
7 See generally Harvath, supra note 1.
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tion argument is that a State which makes welfare available to
needy citizens cannot divide the citizenry into new residents and
old residents for the purpose of denying payments to the former
class. Of the two recent decisions discussed here, only the Connecticut one considers the privileges and immunities argument; both
discuss the equal protection aspect.
In Thompson v.Shapiro,8 the plaintiff had moved from Boston, Massachusetts, to Hartford, Connecticut, in order to be near
her mother, a Hartford resident. She had one child prior to moving, and a second child shortly thereafter. While in Boston, the
plaintiff had received Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) and she
immediately applied to the State of Connecticut for similar assistance. ADC funds were denied her because she had not met the
1-year residency requirement of the Connecticut welfare statute.'
The statute, in essence, denied welfare to those entering the
State "without visible means of support for the immediate future."'"
This provision was interpreted by the Connecticut Welfare Department to exclude those who came without specific employment,
or income or resources enough to sustain them for at least 3
months."1
The plaintiff maintained that the statute violated her rights under the Constitution, alleging violations of the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2, and of the privileges and
immunities and equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment.
The federal district court of Connecticut, sitting as a three-judge
court, found for the plaintiff holding that the statute abridged the
14th amendment privilege of a citizen of the United States to move
into a State and reside there enjoying the benefits of citizens of that
State.' 2 It further held that a statute which on its face denies welfare benefits to a new resident of a State for 1 year because of his
indigent condition upon entering is violative of the equal protection
clause of the 14th amendment."3 The court rejected the article IV
argument' 4
8270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Jan.

16, 1968).
9

CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2(d) (Additional Supp. 1965).
10 Id.
" Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 333 (D. Conn. 1967), cert. granted, 36
U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1968).
12 Id. at 334.
13 Id. at 338.
14Id. at 334. It was not disputed that the plaintiff was a citizen of Connecticut,
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In finding the privileges and immunities violation, the court
relied on the right of citizens of the United States to travel freely
1" The
through the various States as stated in Edwards v. California.
doctrine of the concurring opinions in Edwards applied the privileges and immunities clause to statutes which prohibited travel.
This rule was extended in United States v. Guest.' Guest found a
violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th amendment in upholding an indictment for practices which merely discouraged travel.
The statute in Thompson clearly did not prohibit travel. The
question, then, becomes whether Thompson fits within the Guest
rule, or is an extension of it. The court defined the discouraging
effects of the Connecticut statute as a denial of a gratuitous benefit." By denying the benefit, the statute indirectly interfered with
a constitutional right. 8 This, it seems, is an extension of Guest,
where the act and the effect were directly related.
In finding that the statute violated the 14th amendment equal
protection requirements, the Thompson court asked the question of
whether the statute made reasonable classifications in light of its
purpose. 9 The court found that the purpose of the statute was to
protect the State treasury from indigents who entered the State solely
as welfare seekers."0 This was one of the arguments of the State
of California in Edwards, and Thompson cites Edwards in holding
this purpose invalid.2 ' And, the court reasoned, even if this purpose were valid, there was no evidence that persons with jobs or cash
therefore, since the controversy was not between a State and a citizen of another State,
the court felt article IV, section 2 was not applicable.
15 314 U.S. 160 (1941). Edwards involved a California statute which made it a
misdemeanor to aid a nonresident indigent in entering the State of California. The Supreme Court unanimously held the statute unconstitutional. The majority opinion
held the statute "an unconstitutional barrier to interstate commerce," thus violating
article I, section 8. Two concurring opinions, while not rejecting the majority's view,
felt that the real question was whether there was a violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th amendment. The concurring opinions held that the right
to travel was a privilege of a citizen of the United States, and that a statute which prohibited a citizen from a legal exercise of this right violated the 14th amendment.
16 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
17 270 F. Supp. at 336.

18Id.
19 Id. See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Morey v. Daud, 354
U.S. 457 (1956).
20 270 F. Supp. at 337.
21Id.
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stakes at the outset would, in the long run, be lesser drains on the
State treasury.2 2
It is unfortunate that the court did not offer a more detailed
examination of the question of whether a State may try to protect
its treasury by discouraging welfare seekers. It would seem that
this and other policy considerations deserve more consideration.
There was a vigorous dissent in Thompson which argued that the
State of Connecticut should not be subjected to an influx of people from other States who come solely because the other States have
less lucrative welfare programs'
The dissent also pointed out that
residency requirements exist for various other purposes, e.g., voting, and that the policies which support these should be taken into
consideration in the welfare area. The dissent quoted Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette2 4 for the proposition that the test for an equal protection
violation should be "whether legislators could in reason have enacted such a law."2 5 It certainly seems that there were some arguably rational reasons for the Connecticut statute.
Some 10 days after the Thompson decision came down, the
federal district court for Delaware decided the case of Green v.
Department of Public Welfare.26 Here, the plaintiff had moved to
Delaware with his wife and children for the purpose of taking a job
in the building trade. He did in fact get the job, but bad weather
and the seasonal nature of the work did not allow him to earn
enough to support his family. His application for welfare payments was denied because he had not resided in Delaware for 1 year
as required by the Delaware statute.2 7
The plaintiff filed a class action seeking a declaratory judgment
that the statute was unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment and the commerce clause of
22 Id. at 338. The implication of course is that the burden was on the State to
produce evidence in support of its rationale.
2
3 Id. at 339 (dissenting opinion).
24 319 U.S. 624 (1942).
2 270 F. Supp. at 340, quoting from 319 U.S. at 647:
It can never be emphasized too much that one's own opinion about the wisdom or evil of a law should be excluded altogether when one is doing one's
duty on the bench. The only opinion of our own even looking in that direction that is material is our opinion whether legislators could in reason have
enacted such a law.
See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
20 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967).
27
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 504 (1953).
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article 1, section 8.28 The court held the statute unconstitutional as
a violation of the 14th amendment because it constituted an "invidious discrimination" against a new citizen of Delaware.
The question presented in Green was slightly different from that
in Thompson because the Delaware statute made no distinction between new residents based on financial position or job expectation;
instead it applied to all new residents.29 In fact, the plaintiff in
Green would have qualified for aid under the Connecticut statute.3"
The Green court examined the statute to see if the classifications therein made were reasonable in light of the legislative purpose. The court found three possible purposes and considered each
separately. The admitted legislative purpose of the welfare statute
as a whole was to promote welfare, promptly and humanely, in order to preserve family life.3 The court decided that the 1-year
requirement tended to frustrate rather than implement this purpose. 2
The second purpose, the protection of the public purse,33 was dis34
missed by the court on the authority of Edwards v. California.
As in Thompson, the court refused to look farther than the Edwards
precedent,3" thereby ignoring the obvious distinguishing argument
that in protecting the funds available for welfare payments, the
State is protecting its residents who need such aid, consequently promoting the welfare and preserving the family life of Delaware residents.
The third purpose offered for the requirement was the most interesting. It was argued that the statute was designed to assure that
welfare recipients were bona fide residents of the State of Delaware.3" There were three alternatives put forth in support of this
argument. One was that the 1-year span was needed to investigate
the claims of applicants to protect against fraud. The second was
that a "durational residency requirement" was needed to assure the
proper intent to establish domicile. The third argument was an
28

The court never reached the article I, section 8 issue. For a discussion of the
application of the commerce clause to welfare residency requirements, see Harvath, supra
note 1.
29 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 504 (1953).
30 See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
31

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 501 (1953).

32270 F. Supp. at 177.
33I d.

314 U.S. 160 (1941).
35 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
36 270 F. Supp. at 177.
34
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analogy to voting cases where it has been held that a "durational
residency requirement" is valid."
The court dismissed all three of these propositions, stating that
1 year was an unreasonable period to require a person to wait to
have a claim processed."8 The court also found that "a domiciliary
under Delaware common law is defined as one who is physically
present in Delaware with an intention to remain indefinitely," 9 and
concluded that for purposes of traditional domicile, 1 year was too
long a period for a reasonable test of intention. This is a sensible
result, for to hold otherwise would be to create a new concept of
domicile.
The argument by analogy to voting cases was clearly the defense's strongest point, and the court treated it in a curious manner.
The court seemed to admit that a period of residence was a valid
condition precedent to the right to vote.40 The arguments for a
voting requirement are that it is needed for indentification purposes
and to protect against fraud.41 The court disposed of the identification problem by calling 1 year an unreasonably long time to investigate a claim. However, the contention that the requirement was
to protect the State against persons entering for a single purpose
(to vote or to collect welfare payments) brought the court directly
to the real issue involved.
The entire analysis of the court in settling this important issue
was contained in one sentence: "But certainly it takes little logic
to conclude that the need for food, clothing and lodging has an aspect of immediacy which differentiates it in kind from the right to
vote."' 4 Therefore, with little explanation, and, as the court itself
says, with "little logic," the court arrived at a new test for the validity of residency requirements. If a State denies a generally available benefit to a new citizen for a period of -time, and this denial
involves an immediate need, then the denial will violate the 14th
amendment. The court gave no further definition of an immediate
need than "food, clothing, and lodging."
37 Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904); Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721
(D. Md. 1964), afj'd per curia=, 380 U.S. 125 (1965); Mabry v. Davis, 232 F. Supp.

930 (W.D. Tex. 1964).
38 270 F. Supp. at 177. The court gave no indication of what it would consider a
reasonable time to be.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 178.
41
See cases cited note 37 supra.
42 270 F. Supp. at 178.
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There have been but three other reported cases challenging welfare residence requirements." One of these was decided prior to
44 and has been held to
Edwards v. California,
have been overruled
45
by Edwards; the second was in the District of Columbia where the
14th amendment arguments are inapplicable.46 The third case, decided in December 1967, held the Pennsylvania residency requirement unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.47 Thompson and Green were both cited.
However, Thompson and Green have left some interesting questions for the future. Aside from the fate of 1-year residency requirements for ADC in other States, there are some 35 States which
have residency requirements for old age and deaf and blind benefits.4 8 These latter restrictions generally require residence for 5 of
the preceding 9 years including the year prior to application.49
43 Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65, (E.D. Pa. 1967); Harrell v. Tobriner, 269
F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1967); People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 30
N.E.2d 46 (1940).
44 People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 30 N.E.2d 46 (1940).
45 Green v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173, 177 (D. Del. 1967).
46 Harrell v. Tobriner, 269 F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1967).
This three-judge panel,
with one dissent, ruled the District of Columbia residence requirement unconstitutional,
as violative of equal protection of the laws. But, since the 14th amendment only applies to the States, not to Congress, the result can only be explained as an extension of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. If so, the case provides a fine example
of poor judicial craftsmanship: a novel interpretation of the fifth amendment without
any discussion at all of the issue. See generally Lewis, The High Court: Final ... But
Fallible, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 528 (1968). If federal public policy were involved,
the court certainly did not so state.
47 Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
48 There are some 40 States which have 1-year residency requirements for the ADCtype aid. See Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 338-39 (D. Conn. 1967) (dissenting opinion); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE REPORT # 50, CHARACTRISTICS OF STATE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PLANS
(1962).
49 It is interesting to note that all of these requirements meet the standards of the
Social Security Act which makes provision for federal participation in State welfare
programs. With regard to dependent children the Act specifies that the Commissioner
"shall not approve any plan which imposes as a condition of eligibility for aid
to dependent children, a residence requirement which denies aid with respect to any child
residing in the State who has resided in the State for one year immediately preceding
the application for such aid .... .Social
Security Act § 402(b), 42 U.S.C. § 602(b)
(1964).
With regard to aid for the aged, the Commissioner shall not approve a plan which
includes "[ajny residence requirement which excludes any resident of the State who
has resided therein five years during the nine years immediately preceding the application for old-age assistance and has resided therein continuously for one year immediately
preceding the application .... " Social Security Act 5 2(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 1202(b)
(1964).
In the case of benefits for the disabled, no plan shall be approved which contains
"[a~ny residence requirement which excludes any resident of the State who has resided
therein five years during the nine years immediately preceding the application for aid
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The decisions in Thompson and Green deal only with ADC-type
aid, but there seems to be no reason why the arguments could not
be extended to the other areas of categorical welfare. It would seem
that the aged, deaf, and blind would be less mobile than those seeking ADC, while their needs would be no less immediate.
In summary, the Thompson case appears to be an extension of
0 in that it
the right to travel principle of United States v. Guest,"
finds a discouragement where a State merely denies a gratuity for a
fixed period of time. And, when Thompson is read with Green,
these cases present a rather arbitrary finding that it is a violation of
the 14th amendment equal protection clause for a State to attempt
to protect itself from welfare seekers by a durational residency requirement.
FRANK I. HARDING III
and has resided therein continuously for one year immediately preceding the application .. " Social Security Act § 1402(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1352(b) (2) (1964).
rO 383 U.S. 745 (1966).

